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Abstract 
Studies of the relationship between religion and economics can be divided into three 
major lines of research: behavioural economics of religion (microeconomic approach), 
macroeconomic consequences of religion and religious explanations of economic 
phenomena. Except for the third line strong evidence has been found on the 
microeconomic level of individuals and households that economic behaviour and 
outcome correlate with religion. Furthermore the role of religion on the macroeconomic 
level, e.g. the impact on economic growth, has been analyzed, too. 
However, only a few models integrating these two levels exist. In order to exemplify such 
an integrated model, the first step of the analysis has to be the examination of the 
decisions taken on the microeconomic level. For this purpose this paper focuses on 
rational incentives to be religious and to take part in religious activities without taking into 
account the benefits derived from religious believes itself. 
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“"For man's character has been moulded by his every-day work, and the material 
resources which he thereby procures, more than by any other influence unless it be that of 
his religious ideals; and the two great forming agencies of the world's history have been the 
religious and the economic".”  (see Marshall 1920: 1.) 
 
Social phenomena, including religious issues, were analysed within an economic 
framework at first in the eighteenth century. In this context, Durkheim’s 1897 study of the 
role of religiosity regarding differing suicide rates ought to be mentioned (see Gruber 2005). 
He explains the lower suicide rates in Catholic communities compared to those of Protestant 
communities by the fact, that Catholics are more socially integrated in their denomination.  
The first contributions to the economic analysis of religion can be traced back to Thomas 
Aquinas on the one hand who dealt with religion and public finance, and the well known 
statements by Adam Smith, who noted, that culture could explain economic actions on the 
other hand.  
From today’s perspective one has to state two things concerning religion and economics, 
which both care about the human well-being: on the one hand a continuing significance of 
religion connected with the very obvious fact that the decisions of human beings are 
influenced by emotions as well as by logic can be observed. On the other hand one has to 
realise the persistent interpersonal and international income differences, which can be no 
longer explained by material factors alone. These trends could serve as an explanation for 
the increased interest of economists in religious issues since the late twentieth century.  
Since that time many studies and literature has been published to document the diverse 
associations between measures of “religiosity” and social-economic outcome
1. Aside from 
the views of anthropologists, psychologists or sociologists, the line of research in economic 
theory addressing religion can be divided into two major parts. 
One line of research is dealing with the influence of religion on an economic relevant 
                                                  
1 For a recent survey on Economics of Religion see Kumar, V. 2008.  outcome of the macroeconomic and individual level. The probably best known author in this 
context was Max Weber. Following his argument, the economic development of the western 
world is to some extent ascribed to the Protestant Revolution. Nevertheless his publicity you 
can find mixed empirical evidence for his findings (see Blum and Dudley 2001). Studies on 
the aggregate level (within and between countries) investigate how religion affects measures 
of economic outcomes like per capita income, growth rate of per capita Gross Domestic 
product (GDP) respectively average GDP per capita, the saving ratio, corruption, trade and 
institutions, partly with emphasis on particular religious traditions such as Islam, Hinduism or 
Catholicism. On the microeconomic level of households and individuals a strong link 
between religiosity and a wide range of (economically relevant) social behaviour exists: 
mental and physical health, deviant behaviours (crime, drug and alcohol abuse, suicide), 




Figure 1: Relationship between rligion and soial-economic issues 
Another line of research is represented by David Hume and Karl Marx, who inverted this 
direction of causality and were at best sceptical of the role of religion. For Marx religion 
seems to be a “by-product”. The focus has been on the factors of both sides, supply and 
demand. Believers were seen as rational consumers who want to maximize their utility and 
chose different levels of religiosity due to their distinct preferences. This research line 
suggests a relation at the individual and aggregate level between economic (income, 
urbanization, life expectancy, etc) and scientific development (education) on the one hand 
and the importance of religion on the other hand. On the supply side demand is treated as a 
fixed factor and one focuses on how religious phenomena of interest vary with changes in 
the supply of religious goods. These approaches aim to explain the existence of religious organisations which were seen as clubs
 or firms that collectively constitute a religious market 
where they have to earn the resources necessary to assure the company’s survival. One 
assumes that the suppliers like the demanders of religious goods act rational, too, and try to 
maximize social welfare, efficiency, membership, longevity or the share in God serving 
activities of society. 
A third line of research is dealing with religious explanations of economic phenomena. 
Religious Economics is independent from the other two approaches and focuses primarily 
on the analysis and criticism of the economic development from a theological point of view. 
When looking at the several studies, some shortcomings ought to be mentioned. First, 
when religion has been included as a variable of interest, it has often been measured by 
global indicators (such as denominational affiliation, frequency of church attendance, 
frequency of prayer, or self-rated religiousness) that are poorly theoretically linked to 
measures of economic well-being. Even when significant results are obtained, they provide 
little insight into how religion works in the lives of individuals.  
I will try to explain this mechanism with the explanation of the incentives to be religious. 
Hence, I am going to start my analysis concerning the relationship between religion and the 
economy one step further back and investigate not only the incentives provided by religions 
to behave in a certain way, but also the incentives that people may have to believe and take 
part in religions. 
Another problem with global religious measures seems to be, that they were built on the 
supposition of an underlying stability in religiousness. One assumes that religion influences 
some attributes like hard work, initiative, belief in the value of education, propensity to save 
and invest and so on. On the one side these attributes are not correlated with economic 
progress, e.g. saving is good, but only if the savings are deployed in productive ways. 
Whereas on the other side the helpfulness of religiousness may vary across time, context 
and situations, e.g. frugality served Japan well until its recession, since that time it has been 
an obstacle to recovery. According to the assumption that each of the major world religions 
promotes accumulation of wealth and hard work, while discouraging idleness, debt, and poverty, as McCleary 2007 has exemplarily shown, it is better to examine the shape 
(fundamentalism, private vs. public held religiosity,…) of religion rather than analysing which 
religion fosters which attitude. 
A bulk of studies only deals with Judeo-Christian tradition, but even if there are no 
empirical data for other religions you have to concern yourself with the richness and diversity 
of religion beyond the Western World in theoretical approaches.  
Summing up, to my knowledge it doesn’t exit an approach dealing with the complete line 
of argumentation, which means to me starting with the question: Looking from an economic 
point of view, why are people religious today?  
Before giving an overview concerning the several motives people might have to be 
religious, I am going to go more into detail on the relevant literature.  
 
(2) Literature  Review 
Some literature addresses moral principles and how they fit into people's decision-making 
process (for examples see Bentham 1970, Harsanyi 1977 and Sen 1977). It was stated that 
individuals act on both self-interest and moral "sympathies" whose claims are enforced 
internally by conscience. 
Only a few authors really stress the relationship between religion and incentives. On the 
one hand you can study incentives set by religions to foster different kinds of behaviour. The 
main focus here lays on the importance of heaven and hell respectively salvation and salvific 
merits in fostering or preventing desirable respectively undesirable behaviour (for examples 
see Hull and Bold 1994, Ruffle and Sosis 2003, Klick 2004, McCleary 2007).  
On the other hand, one step further back, the incentives to be religious are examined in 
very few articles. Allport and Ross 1967 pointed out the importance of distinguishing 
individuals motivated by goals intrinsic to religious life from people motivated by values 
extrinsic to the character of religion, such as a desire for status or self-justification. Most 
empirical studies in this field found that greater intrinsic religiousness was related to better 
mental health, sociability, sense of well-being, tolerance and lower levels of prejudice.  Brañas Garza, García Muñoz and Neuman 2008 examine how measures of religious 
practice might be affected by incentives. They show that, when positive and negative 
incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter in encouraging 
religious practice. The effect of the carrot (heaven) was found to be more than twice as large 
as the effect of the stick (hell). To conclude, in the presence of the largest possible stakes 
(infinitum rewards), rewards (carrots) are more effective than punishment in encouraging 
religious practice. Contrary to Hull and Bold 1994, who showed that at a certain point the 
introduction of hell is more effective than increasing the claimed rewards in heaven for 
encouraging social desired behaviour, the paper of Brañas Garza, García Muñoz and 
Neuman shows that for encouraging religious practice the rewards of the heaven are more 
effective.  
 
(3)  Incentives to be religious  
In general, individual behaviour is determined by incentives, which means, that persons 
don’t act randomly, but systematically. They choose to participate in a religion respectively 
stay religious according to its perceived benefits and costs.  
The goods provided by religions are more or less beneficial to the agent. Religions 
interpret the world and give answers to the essential questions of existence (e.g. the 
meaningfulness of life and death). They try to give a sense of meaning in a confusing world. 
Thereby the interpretations and answers are based on the transcendent world which 
addresses the core of religions. Therefore religious institutions seem to be more than one 
among many types of social organizations. Furthermore religions provide moral and ethical 
teachings which give the believer a sense of right and wrong. They want their followers to 
behave in a specific way. Thereby religions influence the way people consume and produce 
goods and interact. One might say that religions have a share in building up the “moral – 
capital stock” of a society and in the relief of the judicial system. A question arising in this 
content is whether religion could be more effective in enforcing behaviour than the state. 
Next to these main products several by-products are produced in joint production process: membership in a community, education and preservation of knowledge, charity (e.g. 
nursing), and help in secular affairs.  
Due to the fact that religions are willing to restrict the benefits to those who undertake 
demanding rituals and prohibitions, although membership is a necessary condition for 
enjoying the provided religious and social goods, it is not sufficient for being saved or 
enlightened. Generally one may consider two main motivations for being religious: intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivations (e.g. Allport and Ross 1967). Thereby I understand being religious 
as meaning believe in and / or belong to a specific denomination. By distinguishing 
individuals motivated by goals intrinsic to religious life from people motivated by values 
extrinsic to the character of religion,
2 it becomes clear that extrinsic motivated people pursue 
secular goals when being religious whereas the intrinsic motivated are striving primarily for 
salvation, meaning and enlightenment. However they will participate on the provided secular 
goods, too. In this context, the question raises, if this fact leads to a crowding out of the 
intrinsic motivation as it is the case in secular issues. Nevertheless, only these true followers 
of a religion can totally benefit. 
 
a. “Believing”-Motive 
Intrinsic motivations are expressed by the “believing”-motive which reflects the core 
product of religions and is only provided by religions. Religious people get the benefit by 
believing per se. People have several ideas concerning the creation of the world, the 
meaning of life and expectations of the consumption in an afterlife, may it be heaven, hell, 
rebirth or an intermediate state like the purgatory (see Durkin and Greely (1991)). These 
expectations could be seen as calculated on a subjective probability of believing in the 
existence of a supreme being: either it exists or not. Believers then get a direct benefit out of 
the function of religions to give meaning and explanations about the held expectations. Due 
to these explanations the uncertainty upon the “Supreme Being” and the afterlife is reduced. 
                                                  
2 For an empirical distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religious motivated individuals see Bergin, 
Masters and Richards 1987; Donahue 1985; Ryan, Rigby and King 1993. Moreover religious belief and practice provide individuals the faith that their lives are 
sanctioned and supported by a ”Supreme Being”. They believe that they belong to a divine 
plan which gives their lives sense. Due to the decreased uncertainty about life and afterlife, 
feelings of religious and spiritual satisfaction and comfort awake.  
Furthermore religious contribution is backed by the motivation to get some guidance in 
life. The moral values and social norms established by religions could serve in this purpose. 
These behavioural rules determine how to live according to a divine plan. The moral-creating 
and order-giving power of religion arises from its origin, which goes back to an authority that 
is free from human weaknesses. In this way religions offer clear rules for living which could 
even solve socially problematic conflicts of interest.  
If the religious institutions (prophets, canonical texts, ecclesiastical hierarchies), that 
define the salvific merit, give people the possibility to gain salvation through their own efforts, 
people will employ the necessary resources to attain such an end. Therefore the intrinsic 
motive to be religious has very strong implications for behaviour and will influence such traits 
like work effort, saving, and charity (see McCleary 2007). The question why an individual is 
looking for salvation or answers to essential questions of life shouldn’t be so much of an 
issue of economics than of philosophy although the rational explanations range from 
education and socialisation to tradition.  
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 32) pointed out, that a”[A]lthough all three motives [salvation, 
motive, consumption motive and reputation motive; note from the author] are undoubtedly 
present, our model will primary consider the salvation motive…” As in most studies, the 
primary motivation for religious participating was assumed to be "afterlife consumption", 
which describes a strong restriction. Next to this main motive other secular causes of being 
religious exist, that are rooted in the “Here and Now”. These motives should be taken into 
account as well. People who are lacking any internalized religious principles are extrinsically 
motivated, i.e. they use their religion for personal or social gains, even at the expense of 
others. As the Consumption- and the Reputation-motive refer to communally held beliefs 
and dogmas, that are expressed publicly, their satisfaction requires a community.   
b. Consumption-motive 
Next to religious goods, religions promote group solidarity and cooperation, how 
anthropological studies have shown (e.g. Irons 2001, Rappaport 1999, Sosis and Alcorta 
2003, Wilson 2002). In this context people don’t benefit from an expected state of bliss in the 
remote future or getting answers to questions of the afterlife but from group membership. 
Thereby religious rituals (see Ruffle and Sosois 2003) serve as mechanisms to achieve 
solidarity and cooperation. Participants in religious activities may benefit from religions 
through the direct consumption of religious meetings in the form of entertainment during 
church attendance and mutual activities even without really believing. Due to the emerging 
positive externalities the benefits from membership don’t only depend on one’s own inputs 
but also on the inputs (quantitative and qualitative ones) of the other fellows. Furthermore 
one might benefit from membership to a community and taking part in a network (charity, 
trade, mutual help, and education) as in other social societies and clubs, too. The social 
membership in religions seems to be a method for turning outsiders into insiders, because 
only the person who is a club-member participates in the network and is protected from 
outside threats. The trade connections of the Jews in the Middle-Ages are an example of 
transaction security and the intensity of the interactions within the group, which lead to 
increased economic transactions among the group-members (e.g. Helble 2007). But the 
stricter the religious system is the more rigid are the boundaries maintaining those who fall 
inside and outside of the group. Moreover the closeness with like-minded believers fosters 
social ties and creates a strong sense for community where one enjoys the offered 
fellowship of others. According to a study, conducted by the German Allensbach Institute for 
Public Opinion Research, church membership is primarily based on the possibility to give 
celebrations a dignified setting. Therefore consumption seems to be very important (see 
Schulz 2000).  
 c. Reputation  motive 
Whereas the Consumption-motive is targeted on the benefits of attendance, the 
Reputation-motive, which is another explanation for religious participation, is based on the 
capital value of reputation and functions in a rather indirect way. Reputation in this context 
means to raise expectations to a potential transaction partner outside the group, which only 
makes sense if one assumes that there are information asymmetries. People who are 
looking for reputation don’t care about believing. Furthermore they don’t only want to belong 
to the group because of their Consumption-motive, but also to signal outsiders their moral 
character. Who is committed to a religious organisation by membership and participation 
and therefore signals to accept a certain religious code of conduct, seems to be a more 
trustworthy partner, because breaking agreements would cause internal and external 
sanctions. One expects that a religious person will honour his promises even when material 
incentives favour breaking them. Therefore this moral information (information with respect 
to an individual's moral history) provides potential transaction partners with information 
permitting them to assess the risks associated with a given exchange. A membership out of 
fear of social ostracism and discrimination is based on the Reputation-motive, too.  
The power of the Reputation-motive could be measured by the market density of a 
religion. If more people in one’s personal environment belong to a specific denomination, the 
probability rises that you will join them. As Gruber 2005 found, a higher market density leads 
to a significantly increased level of religious participation. In that case the person seems to 
be a conformist, who is influenced in his religious convictions by what he/she thinks about 
what others could do (see Sliwka 2006). Furthermore the reputation-spending power of 
religions relies on membership numbers. In a religion where everyone belongs to a 
denomination, the membership says little about the reputation of a person, and secession 
doesn’t mean a huge loss of reputation.  
Nevertheless, to merely seem religious isn’t a sufficient condition for getting economic 
benefits. One’s potential trading partner has to know about it. Surely it is insufficient for a 
person to declare: “I am Christian/Muslim/Buddhist, trust me!” Since religious belief is not directly observable, it only can be communicated if it is accompanied by credible signals that 
one is religious and can be trusted. Membership to certain religious organisations could 
serve as such a signal for one’s upstanding moral character, trustworthiness, and honesty. 
Due to the condition that religious belief is hardly to observe, taking part in religious activities 
(rituals, charity events,…) could be understood as a valuable signal of group commitment. 
By making highly specific investments concerning religion, the investor, who wants to appear 
religious, signals his truthful commitment. This view is opposed to Iannaccone 1992, who 
sees costly religious activities as a possibility to screen out free-riders from religious 
services. But membership is only a necessary and not sufficient condition to show one’s 
moral character: one has to assure to live according to the religious code of conduct (norms 
for everyday behaviour: praying, food preparation, rules of cleanliness) either. 
Next to signalling, where the needed information is given voluntarily, screening is a 
possibility of getting to know if someone is a reliable transaction partner. But here moral 
information about individual members can only be derived from religious activities that are 
publicly observable.  
Summarizing one can say, that consumption and reputation rely more on the social 
capital character of religions and therefore one expects to belong to an increased level of 
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Figure 2: Incentives to be religious  
d.  Costs of being religious and taking part in religious activities 
To benefit from religion, investments (monetary and non-monetary) are also necessary. 
This holds for intrinsic and extrinsic religiously motivated people. Generally the costs of 
being religious can be divided into costs which are connected to the learning and the 
compliance of the moral rules and costs that arise when breaking the rules.  
Intrinsic motivated people have to face costs which arise out of the compliance of the 
moral rules (e.g. main condition: requiring membership, taking part in collective activities; 
specific (moral) behaviour injunctions, rules of cleanliness, medical treatment, food 
preparation) as well as the costs of acquiring spiritual capital. The term spiritual capital is 
used according to the “religious human capital” in Durkin and Greedly (1991: 182 ff) and 
Iannaccone (1990: 299). It encompasses on the one hand the knowledge of religious 
traditions, rites and norms which was acquired over the time by attending religious services 
and community activities as well as by praying and meditating. This know-how is necessary 
to practice religious activities and to get satisfaction out of it. On the other hand, investments 
in the relationship to other fellows, which have an impact on the benefits derived from 
religious attendance (see Iannaccone 1998) belong to spiritual capital, too. As the analysis 
has shown, the intrinsic motivated religious people only derive direct utility if an adequate 
spiritual capital stock was accumulated. Moreover being religious raise internal and external 
costs of disobedience (social control). Breaking the rules would cause internal sanction 
mechanisms for the intrinsic motivated person, because the concept of an “all seeing Judge 
of the World” performs as an enforcement and monitoring mechanism for moral conduct 
among the believers that supplements the social constraints on behaviour and the 
enforcement efforts of secular authorities, even in cases in which one is unobserved by 
others. Due to the fact, that the costs of an external monitoring of every individual‘s 
behaviour are extremely high, the system of internalized monitoring provided by religions 
represents an efficiency-enhancing adoption to this problem. The external costs raise by a 
sanctioning by the denomination (social ostracism and discrimination). Contrary to intrinsic motivated religious people, the costs which arise out of the 
compliance of the moral rules and of acquiring spiritual capital are lower for extrinsic 
motivated persons, because extrinsic motivated people probably rely on the moral rules only 
if the compliance of the rules is publicly observable. Though people who are striving for 
consumption and / or reputation don’t benefit directly from the accumulation of spiritual 
capital, a credible level of spiritual capital is necessary to persuade others of one’s 
commitment to the religion and therefore to gain credibility (Reputation-motive). Moreover a 
minimum of religious knowledge is indispensable to get an insight into religious rites to 
derive benefit from religious activities (Consumption-motive). 
Extrinsic motivated persons have to face internal physiological costs raised by the 
cognitive discordances, which evolve out of the inconsistency between their actions (going 
to places of worship and taking part in religious activities and networks) and their belief 
(don’t belief in the religious statements). Just as for intrinsic motivated persons there might 
be a sanctioning by the denomination in terms of loss of reputation, social ostracism and 
discrimination when breaking the moral rules.  
Monetary disbursements occur, for instance, in terms of donations and financial 
resources which are connected to the compliance of the rules and the attendance at 
religious activities.  
It’s needless to mention the problems of investigating the differences between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations. First, religious bounded institutions and therefore religious mental 
models and ideologies only affect the behaviour of intrinsic motivated people who really 
believe. Therefore joining a religious organization for social reasons does not necessarily 
produce the kind of belief that leads to personal traits that enhance productivity. Second, 
because there could be gains from appearing religious, extrinsic motivated people will 
attempt to express the signals of religiousness. From an empirical point of view, the difficulty 
lies in distinguishing those deeds done out of the belief by itself from those rooted in secular 
causes.  For instance, character traits would be useless as signals since people who lack 
them could perfectly imitate them. One has to find signals that can’t be imitated so easily. As a starting point one may differ between activities that are obligatory and those that are 
voluntary. People, who are more committed, will fulfil voluntary acts beyond the average 
believer, not only obligatory ones. As the people, who are extrinsically motivated, are forced 
to signal their moral character, on the other hand this enhanced commitment could be 
interpreted as a sign of extrinsic motivation. Contrary to extrinsic motivated people, 
intrinsically motivated persons care about less whether other people know about his or her 
moral standing. It is sufficient to them that “God” knows.  
Furthermore one assumes that the Consumption- and Reputation-motive don’t have a 
large effect in industrialized countries with a high urbanization rate. But especially in 
developing countries religious observance seems to be a response to underdeveloped legal 
and economic institutions. 
 
(4) Conclusion   
Religions as institutions are only completely relevant for those who truthfully believe. Only 
these true followers of a religion could totally benefit and only these will totally accept the 
restrictions, which are necessary. The true believer lives according to the rules even if this 
means to do without some things.  
An important fact is, that one only can observe the actions of the people that don’t leave 
not their attitudes and values behind. There are usually large deviations during the 
translating of values and beliefs into action and behaviour. Kuran’s work on “preference 
falsification” examines the causes of such deviations. Social pressure might cause an 
individual to choose differently in public than in private. Used within the context of religions, 
one could state, that because of group pressure, the religion preferences people express in 
public often differ from those they hold privately. Such an extrinsically motivated person lives 
also according to the rules, but only as long as one may extract advantages out of the 
adherence.  
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can serve as a coherent 
argument for estimating the influence of religion on several economic outcomes in a more differentiating way. As far as one has internalized the religious belief and the religious code 
of conduct, one follows the strong incentives provided by religions to enforce appropriate 
social behaviour. Religious capital affects output by changing the manner in which 
technology and human capital are used. Religious capital leads to the establishment of 
networks, which are important not only for the religious services they provide but also for 
their non-religious services. Therefore religions have some kind of insurance function (e.g. 
network of charity, especially with respect to health and education). Furthermore religions 
enhance trust, which is considered to encourage repeated interactions necessary for making 
cooperation gains possible.  
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